Executive summary
Confidential computing protects data while it is being processed. The Confidential Computing Consortium, which Microsoft cites, defines it as computation inside a hardware-based, attested Trusted Execution Environment. Azure already encrypts data at rest and in transit. A confidential VM adds a hardware boundary between the workload and the hypervisor, then uses attestation before keys are released. That boundary is real only when the feature is enabled and the configuration matches the policy. This article explains the Azure design, the difference between a confidential VM and Trusted Launch, and the features the current documentation says you give up.
Introduction
Encryption in transit and encryption at rest do not cover plaintext in memory. That is the gap confidential computing is aimed at. Microsoft's overview says that, when Azure confidential computing is enabled and properly configured, Microsoft cannot access the customer's unencrypted data, because the hardware root of trust is not controlled by the cloud provider. The sentence is about that configuration. It is not a claim about every Azure service.
The practical Azure shape of the idea is the confidential VM, plus Azure Attestation as the service that turns hardware evidence into a token a key vault can trust. Confidential containers are a second shape, still tied to the same AMD SEV-SNP evidence. Intel SGX remains a separate enclave technology that Azure Attestation also knows how to check. These are related controls. They are not one switch.
Technical overview
A confidential VM is a hardware-isolated guest. The VM overview lists AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX as the platforms a guest attestation request can identify. Isolation means the hypervisor and the host management code are outside the guest's trust boundary. It does not, by itself, mean every disk, every temp disk, and every key is covered. Those are separate settings.
The VM overview names the controls that can be turned on:
- Hardware isolation from the hypervisor and host.
- Attestation of platform health before the workload starts. If the required isolation is missing, for example if SEV-SNP is not enabled, Azure Attestation does not attest the platform and the VM does not start.
- Optional confidential OS disk encryption, with platform-managed or customer-managed keys. The setting cannot be changed after deployment, and it can slow the initial create.
- Secure key release bound to a successful attestation.
- A dedicated virtual TPM that follows the TPM 2.0 specification.
- Secure Boot by default when confidential OS disk encryption is selected.
Temp-disk encryption is a further opt-in. It uses a symmetric key inside the VM after the disk is attached, because the page file can hold sensitive data that the host could otherwise see.
Trusted Launch is not this feature. Trusted Launch uses Secure Boot and a vTPM, and it can send measurements on a schedule so Defender for Cloud can flag a boot-integrity failure. Azure Attestation will also accept those measured-boot claims for a Key Vault release policy. The attestation overview treats that as measured boot. A confidential VM is the hardware TEE. Do not design a control that assumes they are the same product.
Architecture and components
Four pieces show up in the three Microsoft pages.
- The processor TEE. On a confidential VM that is AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX. On an SGX workload it is an enclave on a supported Xeon, checked with ECDSA attestation. Azure Attestation expects the Azure DCAP client at version 1.10.0 or higher for Xeon Scalable platforms.
- The guest. A confidential VM, or a confidential container group. Container groups are documented on Azure Container Instances and, in preview, on AKS. They isolate the group from the container control plane.
- Azure Attestation. It checks evidence, evaluates a policy, and signs a token. The service's own quote validation, policy evaluation, and token signing run in SEV-SNP confidential containers, so those steps are outside the operator path the overview describes. Tokens are signed with a certificate published at the OpenID metadata endpoint. A relying party can check the signature, the SEV-SNP report embedded in the certificate, the binding of the signing key, and the published code measurements. Microsoft Signing Transparency records the code signatures.
- The key store. Managed HSM or Key Vault releases the key that decrypts vTPM state and unlocks the OS disk. For a container, the documented path is to fetch the hardware report, including with the SKR sidecar, and exchange it for a secret.
Processor report (SEV-SNP or TDX)
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v
Azure Attestation ---- signed token ----> Key Vault or Managed HSM
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| v
+-------- platform boot path --------> vTPM state, then OS disk
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+-------- guest or sidecar ---------> application secret, if you built that release
Platform attestation on an SEV-SNP confidential VM is automatic at boot. Guest attestation is a request the workload makes when it wants to prove the platform to its own relying party. Confidential containers follow the second pattern.
The guest-state disk is a separate volume of several megabytes. It holds the vTPM and UEFI bootloader state. The page says it can have a storage cost. It also says encrypted OS disks have higher costs starting 30 March 2026. This article does not invent a price.
Detailed explanation
Disks
Confidential OS disk encryption binds the disk keys to the VM's TPM and is intended to keep the protected disk readable only by that VM. A separate service encrypts the disk at creation time, so the content does not pass through the hypervisor in the clear during the create. The encryption supports disks smaller than 128 GB. For a larger disk the page says to choose Premium SSDs, and it calls that out in particular above 32 GB. Auto key rotation is not supported. Offline key rotation is the documented path.
Sizes and images
The VM page lists DCasv5, DCasv6, and DCesv6; DCadsv5, DCadsv6, and DCedsv6; ECasv5, ECasv6, and ECesv6; ECadsv5, ECadsv6, and ECedsv6; and NCCadsH100v5 for an NVIDIA H100. It does not, on that list, assign each series letter to AMD or Intel. Confirm the platform with guest attestation rather than with the name.
Images named on the page include Ubuntu 20.04 LTS for AMD SEV-SNP only, Ubuntu 22.04 LTS and 24.04 LTS, RHEL 9.4 or later, Rocky 9.4, and a set of Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server images. SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP5, including the SAP variant, is listed as a tech preview for both SEV-SNP and TDX.
Containers and SGX
A confidential container fetches an SEV-SNP report from the processor. The SKR sidecar is one documented way to do it. The application can also do it itself and present the report to Azure Attestation and to Managed HSM, Key Vault, or a key service the customer runs.
SGX is older and narrower. Code runs in an enclave, and Azure Attestation checks the ECDSA quote. Open Enclave is the portability layer Microsoft describes over that class of TEE. An application written to Open Enclave is not a confidential VM, and a confidential VM is not an SGX enclave.
Attestation operations and failover
Measurement values that identify a valid Azure Attestation instance change when certificates rotate or a security update requires a new policy. The page describes a two-month notice before a planned rotation, and a one-month notice for an unplanned security rotation. That notice is about attestation measurements. It is not the customer's disk-key rotation schedule.
Paired regions fail over through Traffic Manager. In-flight calls break, creates are blocked in the failed region, and data-plane calls continue on the original URI.
Implementation approach
The pages support a sequence. They do not support a single portal script, so this is the order of decisions.
- Choose a documented size and a region where that hardware exists. Availability is regional. Do not assume a global SKU.
- Decide on confidential OS disk encryption before the create. It cannot be changed later. If you need a disk at or above 128 GB, this encryption mode is the wrong tool for that disk.
- Choose platform-managed keys or customer-managed keys. Platform-managed keys are the convenience path. Customer-managed keys keep custody with the customer, and losing the key means the disk cannot be unlocked. There is no automatic rotation.
- Leave Secure Boot as the default that comes with confidential OS disk encryption. Do not add a separate Trusted Launch migration and then describe it as part of the confidential VM.
- Let platform attestation run at boot. The SNP report, on SEV-SNP, goes to Azure Attestation. The token releases the key that decrypts vTPM state and unlocks the OS disk. The VM starts only if that succeeds.
- If the application needs its own secret, build a guest attestation or an SKR sidecar and a Key Vault release policy. The platform boot path does not inject an arbitrary application secret into memory.
- Treat backup as a preview. The page says Azure Backup for these VMs is in public preview. Site Recovery, Accelerated Networking, live migration, boot-diagnostic screenshots, and dynamic memory are listed as unavailable. A design that needs those features does not fit this VM.
- For a container workload, use the container evidence path instead of pretending the VM steps apply.
Enterprise use cases
The Microsoft pages do not publish a bank, a hospital, or a research consortium as a customer story. The uses below are the workloads the controls are built for. They are analysis, not case studies.
- A process that must decrypt records the operator should not read. The overview's claim, when the feature is configured, is that Microsoft cannot access that plaintext.
- A container group that must stay isolated from the platform that scheduled it. That is the confidential container on Container Instances, or on AKS in preview.
- A GPU job on the documented NCCadsH100v5 size, when the data has the same in-use requirement. The page lists the size and does not publish a throughput number.
- A relying party that will not release a key until it has checked an attestation token, including a check that Azure Attestation itself is running in SEV-SNP.
Multi-party computation is a different design. A confidential VM does not, by the documentation used here, combine several customers' private inputs into a joint function. Do not specify it as a feature of this VM.
Security and operational considerations
- The operator exclusion holds for the configured TEE. It does not extend to data you copy out of the guest, to logs you ship in plaintext, or to a key you leave in a vault with no release policy.
- Platform-managed keys are still a custody choice. The overview says Microsoft can hold them for convenience. Customer-managed keys move that custody back, and they add an availability dependency on the key.
- Trusted Launch failures are what Defender for Cloud is documented to surface. Do not assume the same alert exists for every confidential VM vTPM change.
- Guest attestation is how you prove SEV-SNP or TDX to yourself. Platform attestation is how the boot path proves it to Azure. Monitor the one your release policy uses.
- Region and size limits are a security issue as well as a capacity issue. A failover region without the hardware is not a confidential failover.
- The attestation service's business-continuity behavior drops in-flight calls and blocks control-plane creates during a regional failover. Clients need to retry. They do not need a new URI.
- SGX, confidential VMs, and confidential containers have different evidence. A verifier written for one will not accept the others unless you planned for that.
Best practices
- Write down which evidence you trust: platform boot attestation, guest attestation, or both.
- Decide disk encryption before deployment, and record that it is immutable.
- Prefer offline key rotation in the runbook, because automatic rotation is not supported.
- Track Azure Attestation measurement notices on their own calendar. A two-month planned rotation is not a disk-key event.
- Keep Trusted Launch and confidential VMs as separate standards, even when both use a vTPM.
- Test restore against the backup preview before you promise a recovery time.
- Pin the DCAP client requirement if the workload is SGX on Xeon Scalable.
- Re-read the image list when a distribution moves between preview and general availability. SUSE 15 SP5 is the example on the current page.
Challenges and limitations
- No Site Recovery, no Accelerated Networking, no live migration, no dynamic memory, and no boot screenshots. High availability has to be an application design, not a host migration.
- Confidential OS disk encryption stops at disks smaller than 128 GB.
- Backup is a public preview.
- Hardware is regional.
- AKS confidential containers are in preview.
- The sources do not publish a performance delta against a normal VM. Any overhead figure would be an invention.
- Encrypted OS disk pricing changes on 30 March 2026, and the small guest-state disk can add storage cost. Budget from the current price page, not from this article.
Analysis
The control is worth using when the threat you care about is a privileged operator or a compromised host during processing, and when you can live without live migration and Site Recovery. It is the wrong control when the sensitivity ends at the disk and the network, because those two states are already encrypted without a confidential VM. Attestation is the part that makes the hardware claim checkable. Without a release policy that demands the token, the TEE is isolation you have not verified.
Azure Attestation runs its own critical steps in a TEE, and a relying party can verify that. The pages do not prove that a stolen signing key is impossible. Build the verifier. Do not stop at the product name.
What the sources do not settle
- A measured performance cost for SEV-SNP or TDX against a standard VM.
- A date when Site Recovery, Accelerated Networking, or live migration will exist for these VMs.
- A price. The pages point at the pricing calculator and at a March 2026 disk-price change.
- Whether a specific series name is AMD or Intel. Guest attestation is the check the page gives you.
- Any customer deployment in finance, health, or research. Those sectors are not evidenced here.
- A token lifetime for confidential VM guest attestation. Periodic measurement is described for Trusted Launch, not as a universal confidential VM timer.
Conclusion
Protecting data in use means running it in an attested TEE and releasing keys only after that attestation succeeds. On Azure, the documented tools are confidential VMs, confidential containers, SGX where the workload is an enclave, and Azure Attestation in front of Key Vault or Managed HSM. The design is specific: hardware isolation, an immutable disk-encryption choice, a vTPM, and a list of platform features you do not get. Teams that need those missing features should keep the workload on a different VM and accept a different trust boundary. Teams that need the operator out of the plaintext path should use this one, and should test attestation, key loss, and restore before they call it production.
References